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swisscom network issue
by naz 15 Jun '23

15 Jun '23

Hello, someone from swisscom may contact me offlist please ? many of our customers are unable to reach the swisscom network, and most of our customers using swisscom are unable to reach their infrastructure this issue started yesterday . thanks in advance Philippe from SwissCenter

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Fwd: [PDB Announce] Your input sought on PeeringDB's Network Type field
by Arnold Nipper 14 Jun '23

14 Jun '23

Please have your say ... it only takes five minutes TIA and see you next week Arnold -------- Weitergeleitete Nachricht -------- Betreff: [PDB Announce] Your input sought on PeeringDB's Network Type field Datum: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 09:08:43 -0700 Von: Leo Vegoda <leo(a)peeringdb.com> An: pdb-announce(a)lists.peeringdb.com Hi, PeeringDB's Product Committee wants your input on whether the Network Type field is useful. Should it go? Should it change? We have published a very short blog post describing the options and linking to the survey. https://docs.peeringdb.com/blog/network_type_your_input_sought/ <https://docs.peeringdb.com/blog/network_type_your_input_sought/> Your input will influence our decision. Thanks, Leo Vegoda PeeringDB Product Manager -- Keep calm, keep distance, keep connected! Arnold Nipper email: arnold(a)nipper.de mobile: +49 172 2650958

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Sicherheit von SS7 - mit Schweiz-Bezug
by Matthias Leisi 09 Jun '23

09 Jun '23

(Resend von der richtigen Absender-Adresse) https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2023-05-10/ty-article… The Secretive Swiss Dealer Enabling Israeli Spy Firms (…) It leads from the Americas to Africa to South-East Asia, but also to Basel, a mediaeval town on the banks of the Rhine and the unassuming home of Andreas Fink, a Swiss telecom expert whose unusual skills have placed him at the centre of this industry. (…) reveal how Fink's systems have served as a conduit for probing and attacking phone networks across the globe (…) When contacted by this investigation, Fink admitted to working with companies and “legally entitled government agencies” as a provider of surveillance services. (…) Fink's request to Robert was for "SS7 access" and "a bunch of global titles". In other words, he wanted a list of phone numbers, belonging to Robert's phone company, which could be used to send queries to other networks in other countries. (…) -- Matthias Leisi Katzenrütistrasse 68, 8153 Rümlang Mobile +41 79 377 04 43 matthias(a)leisi.net <mailto:matthias@leisi.net>

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Swiss Domain Security Report Q3 2022
by Bohren, Andres 08 Jun '23

08 Jun '23

Hi All, Over the last Months I've created the Swiss Domain Security Report from all ~2.4 Mio .ch Domains. The Report focuses on an overview about Mail security in Switzerland (Data from Q3 2022) All the details can be found here: https://blog.icewolf.ch/archive/2023/06/07/swiss-domain-security-report-q3-… Kind Regards Andres Bohren

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### SwiNOG #38 - Agenda ###
by Simon Ryf 08 Jun '23

08 Jun '23

Dear SwiNOG community, we could finally compile the agenda for the upcoming SwiNOG #38 – June Wednesday 21st Have a look at https://www.swinog.ch/meetings/swinog38/ There is still time to https://register.swinog.ch/ if you have not done it already. We have a super packed agenda. On the other hand, I’m very happy with all the exciting speeches which have made it to the final list. A few last things to wrap up and then we’re ready to welcome you again in ~ 2 weeks. Looking forward to seeing many of you. SwiNOG Core Team

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Re: swinog Digest, Vol 219, Issue 11
by f_sfetea＠yahoo.com 20 May '23

20 May '23

Hmm, instead of securing their networks and pushing for better security standards they'll cut access to one fish. Is that an ideal strategy? Some other bigger meaner fish will still use those vulnerabilities. I was wondering if the GSMA is or should regularly perform security audits. https://www.gsma.com/security/gsma-mobile-security-research-acknowledgement… Or perhaps award publicly visible badges of honor to those mobile networks that are not vulnerable to similar attacks. I mean how many companies do we know? that publicly stated: Hello our mobile users btw. we fixed those vulnerabilities in our network! You should now be better protected. I never got any such information from any of my providers. Did you? Beste Grüsse, Regards si s-auzim de bine Florin Sfetea On Friday, May 19, 2023, 12:00:21 PM GMT+2, <swinog-request(a)lists.swinog.ch> wrote: Send swinog mailing list submissions to swinog(a)lists.swinog.ch To subscribe or unsubscribe via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to swinog-request(a)lists.swinog.ch You can reach the person managing the list at swinog-owner(a)lists.swinog.ch When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of swinog digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Sicherheit von SS7 - mit Schweiz-Bezug (Ralph Krämer) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Thu, 18 May 2023 22:33:17 +0200 (CEST) From: Ralph Krämer <ralph.kraemer(a)vable.ch> Subject: [swinog] Re: Sicherheit von SS7 - mit Schweiz-Bezug To: swinog <swinog(a)lists.swinog.ch> Message-ID: <172298345.199.1684441997706.JavaMail.zimbra(a)vable.ch> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 nice : https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/andreas-fink-mobilfunkverband-g… about time ;-) ----- Am 15. Mai 2023 um 13:31 schrieb Florin Sfetea via swinog swinog(a)lists.swinog.ch: > Hello all, > > I was reading this old(2018) ENISA Report [ > https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/signalling-security-in-telecom-ss7… > | > https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/signalling-security-in-telecom-ss7… > ] > Might help in some way but reading it had reminded me of ARP spoofing/poisoning > attacks which even today are still used and work in a lot of networks that I > have been. :) > > One year later I had open a case with Salt where I requested a public statement > that they had fixed/mediated the issues discovered up to that time(March 2019) > or at least that a remediation plan was in place. > > Someone from Support answered that " The introduction of 5G will only take place > if data security is guaranteed for our customers and we can assume that the > security issue will not lead to a delay in the introduction of 5G. " > > I was not satisfied ::)) with the answer and requested an escalation > > They eventually closed my case in July 2019 with: > > " Dear Sir, > > > Salt follows industry best practices in terms of security for its entire mobile > infrastructures and improves constantly the protection of its mobile > infrastructures and customers. The case you mention is known and has been > addressed accordingly. > " > No public statement nor such other mentions of which fix was exactly addressed. > > I don't have anything with any mobile provider. At that time it was just happen > to be Salt. I move from time to time to different other ones. > > I think we should have here in Switzerland more or less a same similar to ENISA > organization that should supervise and perform regular audits on mobile > providers. Melani/NCSC would that fit your bill? > > I never really had time to further test if any of those vulnerabilities or newer > where actually fixed. Someone should definitely do it. Free for fame or payed > from a government branch is to > [ https://www.gsma.com/security/gsma-mobile-security-research-acknowledgement… > | https://www.gsma.com/security/gsma-mobile-security-research-acknowledgement… > ] > > > Regards, > Florin > > _______________________________________________ > swinog mailing list -- swinog(a)lists.swinog.ch > To unsubscribe send an email to swinog-leave(a)lists.swinog.ch ------------------------------ Subject: Digest Footer _______________________________________________ swinog mailing list -- swinog(a)lists.swinog.ch To unsubscribe send an email to swinog-leave(a)lists.swinog.ch ------------------------------ End of swinog Digest, Vol 219, Issue 11 ***************************************

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Re: Sicherheit von SS7 - mit Schweiz-Bezug
by Florin Sfetea 18 May '23

18 May '23

Hello all, I was reading this old(2018) ENISA Report https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/signalling-security-in-telecom-ss7… Might help in some way but reading it had reminded me of ARP spoofing/poisoning attacks which even today are still used and work in a lot of networks that I have been. :) One year later I had open a case with Salt where I requested a public statement that they had fixed/mediated the issues discovered up to that time(March 2019) or at least that aremediation plan was in place. Someone from Support answered that "The introduction of 5G will only take place if data security is guaranteed for our customers and we can assume that the security issue will not lead to a delay in the introduction of 5G." I was not satisfied ::)) with the answer and requested an escalation They eventually closed my case in July 2019 with: "Dear Sir, Salt follows industry best practices in terms of security for its entire mobile infrastructures and improves constantly the protection of its mobile infrastructures and customers. The case you mention is known and has been addressed accordingly. " No public statement nor such other mentions of which fix was exactly addressed. I don't have anything with any mobile provider. At that time it was just happen to be Salt. I move from time to time to different other ones. I think we should have here in Switzerland more or less a same similar to ENISA organization that should supervise and perform regular audits on mobile providers. Melani/NCSC would that fit your bill? I never really had time to further test if any of those vulnerabilities or newer where actually fixed. Someone should definitely do it. Free for fame or payed from a government branch is to https://www.gsma.com/security/gsma-mobile-security-research-acknowledgement… Regards, Florin

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Mailproblems with / on (isis)servercorner.net
by Mueller Urs SBB CFF FFS 16 May '23

16 May '23

Hello One of my clients got a problem to receive mails from one customer. He sends mails from its system through isis.servercorner.net and the mailserver refuses to accept the mail with a «no such mailbox» answer. But the mailserver should not look for the mailbox but forward to M365. We suspect a wrong mx in the dns of servercorner.net. When we look into the mx of the customer, it looks like: dig mx 4plusarchitektinnen.ch +short 0 4plusarchitektinnen-ch.mail.protection.outlook.com. dig 4plusarchitektinnen-ch.mail.protection.outlook.com +short 104.47.22.10 104.47.22.74 The customer was on a hosting somewhere inside servercorner.net and we suspect there are leftovers. Anybody here from servercorner.net? How to contact? Regards, Urs

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Front de libération des IXPs
by Angry Peer 14 May '23

14 May '23

Just have been made aware of https://www.de-cix.ch/ I would like to join! Have a nice Sunday afternoon, A.P.

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IANA AS Numbers Registry Update
by Selina Harrington 11 May '23

11 May '23

Hi, The IANA AS Numbers registry has been updated to reflect the allocation of the following blocks to APNIC: 151866-152889 Assigned by APNIC 2023-05-10 152890-153913 Assigned by APNIC 2023-05-10 You can find the registry at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/ The allocation was made in accordance with the Policy for Allocation of ASN Blocks to Regional Internet Registries: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/global-policy-asn-blocks-2010-09-21-en Best Regards, Selina Harrington IANA Operations Manager

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